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Abstract: This essay begins by questioning why, among the various interdisciplinary 
studies of literature, religion and literature never became a popular topic of study in 
the IS. It looks at this issue from a theoretical perspective, examining the role of New 
Criticism and other self-contained close reading methods that followed it. It also places 
the lack of interest in religion and literature within the context of the rise of secularism in 
US society and academia. Historically, US universities have disdained religious studies 
as a viable subject of inquiry and have exhibited a marked anti-Catholic prejudice One 
must recognize the degree to which American culture is shaped by Puritan and evan-
gelical values making it difficult to grasp any vision that runs counter to an American 
(read: Protestant) sensibility that values individual revolt and damnation rather than 
focus (as does Catholicism, Hinduism , Islam and Judaism) on moral duty and life envi-
sioned as an obligation. This concept of theodicy is central to our understanding of 
how we engage the Other, the study of which currently dominates recent critical trends 
in identity studies, multiculturalism, post-colonialism and the academic discourse on 
globalization. The second half of the essay examines how the other has been historically 
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configured in philosophy from the classical period through the German Romantics, exis-
tentialists and up to the present. I focus on the Other as understood in the works of Paul 
Ricoeur, Michel de Certeau, and Emmanuel Levinas as possible models for further 
ethical discussions on the Other.
Keywords: Religion – Literature – Philosophy – Identity – Other – Interdisciplinary stud-
ies – University 
 
Resumo: Este artigo começa por se questionar porque não tem hoje muita visibilidade 
o cruzamento entre a Religião e a Literatura, pesem embora as várias propostas inter-
disciplinares que proliferam no sistema educativo. Considera esta questão sob uma 
perspetiva teórica, examinando o papel do New Criticism e de outras correntes críticas 
que se lhe seguiram. Mas também no contexto em que ela se inscreve, sob a crescente 
secularização da sociedade e da academia, nomeadamente nos EUA. Historicamente, 
as universidades norte-americanas foram menosprezando os estudos religiosos como 
assunto passível de investigação, posição a que não era alheio um marcado precon-
ceito anticatólico. Parece-nos evidente o grau a que o Puritanismo e os valores ditos 
evangélicos foram conformando a cultura americana, nela obnubilando a presença 
de qualquer outra visão da sensibilidade americana (lida como protestante), e valo-
rizando os valores individuais da revolta e da danação, não se focando (como sucede 
no Catolicismo, Hinduísmo, Islamismo ou Judaísmo) no dever moral e na vida como 
compromisso. Este conceito de teodiceia é fundamental para a forma de compreensão 
do Outro, tema que domina as mais recentes correntes dos estudos sobre Identidade, 
Multiculturalismo, Pós-colonialismo, bem como em geral o discurso académico sobre 
Globalização. A segunda parte deste artigo examina historicamente algumas configura-
ções paradigmáticas do Outro, desde a filosofia clássica até ao presente, com especial 
relevo para o Romantismo alemão e existencialistas. Focaliza-se ainda na obra de Paul 
Ricoeur, Michel de Certeau e Emmanuel Lévinas, possíveis modelos alternativos nas 
discussões éticas sobre o Outro. 
Palavras-chave: Religião – Literatura – Filosofia – Identidade – Outro – Estudos 
Interdisciplinares – Universidade
I. The Problem of Religion
As someone who has studied theology, the history of religions and 
Comparative Literature and has taught these subjects, I have of late been 
intrigued by the continued neglect shown to the study of religion in the human-
ities. When I was a graduate student, interdisciplinary studies were in their 
infancy. Those were the days when a scholar in a Comparative Literature 
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department could study literature and philosophy, literature and cinema, lit-
erature and the law, or literature and music. I was interested in religion and 
literature, but such courses, I discovered, tended to focus on the study of myths, 
archetypes, or religious symbolism. At the time, I found this patternist approach 
strangely mechanical (in actuality, it was just French, in its focus on myth stud-
ies, i.e. the myth of X in the works of Y) (Tomiche 2016). I was disappointed 
by the fact that such classes usually dealt exclusively with English-language 
texts – lots of William Blake, C.S. Lewis and T.S. Eliot – and tended to be paro-
chial in focus.1 I did not at the time understand the role that Religious Studies 
played in American academe nor its institutionalization in US universities.2 I 
did, however, notice that Religion and Literature did not flourish as a course of 
study to the same degree that the other interdisciplinary configurations (such 
as Literature and Cinema) did and I thought at the time that this lack of interest 
could not simply be attributed to unimaginative curricular decisions – some-
thing else must be at work.
Recently, my research has brought me back to this question of the appar-
ently diminished interest in religion and literature, approaching it now from a 
theoretical and pedagogical perspective. Was there something inherent to or 
in literary studies that prevents religion and literature from coexisting as an 
interdisciplinary subject? Here I decided to examine the methodology in vogue 
when this interdisciplinary dyad was proposed. The then reigning theory, 
New Criticism, focused on close readings; it defined literary texts as discrete 
entities and fostered the interpretation of the text as the primary task of liter-
ary analysis. New Criticism was suited to modernist ideas of the freedom of 
the text from outside influences. It championed a literary text’s self-contained 
nature, detached from history, authorial intent, and reader reaction. Given the 
enthusiastic adoption of New Criticism in American universities, it seemed 
obvious that theoretical problems would necessarily arise when dealing with 
authors who drew on ethics or theology as resources for literary thinking. New 
Criticism (and, for that matter, all the self-contained close-reading methods that 
followed) paralleled the rise of secular culture in and outside the university in 
1  I still remember the only exam I ever refused to complete in a course entitled “Religion and 
Literature” at Harvard Divinity School in the late 1970’s. For the final exam, the professor wrote that 
since hands figured prominently in the books we had read that semester, we should comment on 
the symbolic use of hands in these works. I believe that I started to analyze Faulkner’s Absalom, 
Absalom and then just rebelled and walked out of the exam.
2  In many universities and colleges, religion was a faith-based discipline. In other institutions, the 
teaching of religion was dictated by university statutes. Notably, Ezra Cornell decreed that religion 
could never be taught in the university he founded. So, Cornell University has never had religion 
department, making it difficult to teach South Asian culture, for example. 
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that both tended to diminish the credibility of morality and ethics as intellectual 
resources (Cadegon 2013:176). Such a theoretical focus could explain why no 
one seemed to want to investigate the religious dimensions and connections in 
literature that I found so compelling and complex. But I suspected it was not the 
full answer. So I turned to sociology for further elucidation. 
Here I read studies on the indifference and even disdain for religious issues 
that could be found in American academe. Scholars attributed this méfiance 
to the long establishment of liberal mainstream Protestantism in the American 
university setting.3 Indeed, in some institutions, this disdain manifests itself in 
the complete dismissal of religious studies as a viable subject of inquiry. For 
example, consider the noteworthy case of Cornell University where it is stipu-
lated in the university’s charter that religion should never be taught there. When 
not institutional, the neglect of the study of religion could also be disciplinary. 
As Wilhelm Halbfass has shown, philosophy departments routinely exclude the 
study of Hindu speculative thought from their curricula as too “religious.” 
We are simply not trained in the States to dissociate our individual beliefs 
(or lack thereof) from our ability to critically approach a work of art that fore-
grounds a religious thematic. There is not the tradition, as one finds in France 
with its sciences religieuses, where one can deal with religious phenomena 
within the context of the secular state. Faith (in the form of religious belief or, 
more often, in its distortion as ideology) always intervenes in some negative 
fashion. So does prejudice. Non-Protestant religions in America are routinely 
associated with the Other and the immigrant, an association that triggers nativ-
ism (fear of outsiders). As one sociologist of religion has noted, Americans 
have difficulties “exiling evaluation” (Cadegon 2013:177). We tend to see art as 
deeply implicated by its political contexts. By way of an example, I will choose 
the case of Catholicism, although I believe that arguments can be made for 
Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam experiencing similar forms of intolerance, since 
they are all religions of the Other in America. 
As far back as the founding of this republic, Catholics have been histori-
cally viewed as outsiders. Historians and sociologists have widely studied the 
nativism directed against Catholics as a group in America.4 Andrew M. Greeley, 
in particular, documented the role of anti-Catholic prejudice in American uni-
versities both in the intellectual nativism that suffuses scholarship and teaching 
and in the careers of Catholic academics in elite institutions (Greeley 1976, 
1977). Decades after Greeley’s statistical findings, American students even in 
this era of multiculturalism still exhibit a certain mistrust of texts that deal with 
3  See Marsden 1977:14, 18, cited in Massa 2003:14
4  For a summary of this literature, see Massa 2003.
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Catholic belief structures, as I have learned in my own teaching in predomi-
nantly Baptist and evangelical rural Georgia.5 A prime example of America’s 
reticence to deal with a Catholic worldview can be found in the reception of 
Flannery O’Connor, who is not read to the extent that her work perhaps war-
rants. She is not, for example, studied at all in Women’s Literature classes. 
Here we have an excellent stylist with a uniquely American vision, a female 
writer who wrote about the South, died young, and catered to gothic sensibili-
ties.6 Yet she is not championed as a great American author nor canonized as 
a feminist icon and I suggest that her Catholic religious vision of the world has 
contributed to her marginalization. The experience of teaching her in my class 
on the Self is that these Southern students find her short stories far more foreign 
and incomprehensible than any of the Hindu religious texts I teach in the same 
class! Readers outside of a predominantly Catholic milieu find it difficult to read 
a Catholic author such as O’Connor in anything but a nativist fashion. 
Let’s take another, less regional example, that of Alessandro Manzoni 
and the reception of his masterpiece I promessi sposi. Manzoni’s novel, while 
required reading for all Italian students and taught alongside Mme. Bovary 
throughout Europe, is not often read in the US. The literary critic, Larry Peer, writ-
ing from a non-Catholic perspective, has attributed this neglect of Manzoni to the 
fact that American literary criticism reflects Protestant (and often anti-Catholic) 
pastoral assumptions. Peer contends that American critics, largely influenced 
by this Protestant orientation, exhibit an implicit resistance to the authoritarian 
universality of the Catholicism expounded in an author such as Manzoni (Peer 
1986:22). Among the US population, many hold to the (Protestant) religious men-
tality that they are directed by some inner revelation or a mysterious calling from 
God. This Protestant model of religion stresses a private and voluntary form of 
religious organization in which power and authority rise from the bottom up and 
decisions are voted on by all the members of a congregation. Gatherings within 
the church are for personal and devotional purposes. 
5  Just this past semester in a Comparative Literature class on autobiography, I taught Augustine’s 
Confessions and Mary McCarthy’s Memoirs of a Catholic Girlhood in addition to the standard fare 
of Marcus Aurelius, Rousseau, Frederick Douglass and Vladimir Nabokov. The students in rural 
Georgia had significant difficulties grasping McCarthy, although she was certainly closer to them 
on a number of levels. Her Catholic childhood and concerns simply baffled them. I usually teach 
Sanskrit literature and I can assure you that these students found McCarthy’s discussion of her faith 
as foreign to them as any Hindu text I have ever taught. They had fewer problem with Augustine 
because his style – that of the personal address to the deity – resembled this own Baptist training 
and attitude of a personal relationship with Jesus.
6  If you visit her hometown of Savannah, Georgia, as I did looking for traces of her life there, you are 
far more likely to trace signposts of John Berlant, the author of the bestseller Midnight in the Garden 
of Good and Evil or the minor poet Conrad Aiken than see any evocations of their native daughter. 
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In contrast, Catholic ethics recognizes the rights and duties that are owed 
by individuals to the community. Catholics believe that this stance does not 
diminish the dignity of the individual. Rather it is thought that the individual 
achieves full dignity and moral meaning within the context of the Church itself. 
In other words, Catholics are hierarchical (Massa 2003:69). Protestants speak 
of a one-on-one relationship with God. They view the Catholic’s focus on the 
community, the sacrament, and the hierarchy of the Church as institutional 
oppression (Massa 2003:147). David Tracy maintains that Protestants perceive 
the Catholic institutional understanding of the Holy as a potential source of 
overweening pride and a hegemonic structure that needs to be resisted, since 
it threatens the concerns and values of American democracy (Tracy 1981:410-
15). Protestants vest authority in a gathered community of individual believers 
who democratically determine among themselves the boundaries between the 
sacred and the secular, the church and the world. They understand all too well 
that this mode of operation differs from that of the Catholic Church. But, and 
this is an important point, since Catholicism is not democratic, Protestants have 
historically viewed it as intrinsically anti-American. 
Greeley also investigated how the Catholic communitarian ethic differs 
from Protestant individualism (Greeley 1977). He understands American cul-
ture as primarily shaped by those very Puritan and evangelical values that posit 
that individuals must be protected from the encroaching Catholic oppression 
of the community and its demands (Massa 56). It is with this Protestant paro-
chial context that criticism in the US has traditionally approached literary stud-
ies. A Catholic (and one can extend this issue to other non-Protestant minor-
ity religions) vision of the world would be deemed foreign or “other” to those 
American readers who expect God to behave in literature just as they perceive 
Him as functioning in their own lives. They do not take kindly to books where 
God deviates from their accepted script. For Protestant readers, an absent or 
indifferent God (as one finds in Catholicism and post-Holocaust literature) does 
not suit their religious tastes, particularly if its vision can be seen to run counter 
to a certain American (read: Protestant) sensibility that values individual revolt 
and damnation. A Catholic (or Hindu, Muslim, or Jewish) vision focuses on 
moral duty and life envisioned as an obligation; it relates to the concept of the-
odicy. Such concerns are central to theology: How are we to reconcile divine 
goodness and omnipotence with the reality of the existence of evil and suffer-
ing? In secular terms, how are we to engage with the Other? 
It is this last question that I seek to investigate with you today , since the 
issue of the Other has become paramount in universities and reflects institutional 
mandates for diversity, inclusiveness, and greater tolerance as they are con-
ceptualized in recent critical trends such as identity studies, multiculturalism, 
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postcolonial studies, and the academic discourse on globalization. In fact, 
the humanities and the social sciences in general appear to have been of late 
suffused with discussions of Otherness. Unfortunately, these exchanges often 
ignore complex issues. For example, they pay scant attention to the ethical 
judgments that might inform our understanding of heterology (or the study of 
the Other). I believe we can partially attribute this lack of interest to the afore-
mentioned méfiance towards religion in American academe. However, the 
absence of the ethical dimension here seriously compromises and undermines 
scholarly and institutional engagement with the Other. But, before examining 
in greater depth how we might recuperate sensibilities absent from the current 
academic discourse on alterity, I would first like to offer an historical overview 
of how the Other has been emplotted in philosophy and hermeneutics. In my 
conclusion, I will then offer a blueprint for how we might profitably conceptual-
ize our readings of the Other, using the critical tools provided by Paul Ricoeur, 
Michel de Certeau, and Emmanuel Levinas.
II.  Theoretical Configurations of the Other7
Classical conceptions of the Other focus primarily on its relationship with 
the Self. 
In the Sophist, Plato put the discussion regarding the Other in the mouth 
of the Eleatic Stranger: does the existence of the xénos demand the establish-
ment of another category (héteros génos) beyond Being? The Stranger argues 
that all kinds of beings blend with each other. This mixing of the same (autos) 
with the Other (héteron) makes speech possible (Soph. 259e) and enables us 
to distinguish between what is true and what is false. Without such blending, 
the other is literally unspeakable and unrecognizable (Kearney 2003: 153).
Modern philosophy continues the pattern, set in place by Plato, of refusing 
to allow the Other to be truly other and not a reflection of the self. In Romantic 
hermeneutics, as practiced by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, the purpose of 
philosophical interpretation was to unite the consciousness of one subject with 
that of another through a process of appropriation (Aneigung). Schleiermacher 
explored the retrieval of estranged consciousness in terms of a theological re-ap-
propriation of the original message of kerygma (quoted in Dilthey 1974: 117). 
Dilthey analyzed alterity in terms of the historical resolve to reach some kind of 
objective knowledge about the past (Dilthey 1976: 66–105). Hegel historicized 
7  For a more detailed discussion of the Other in literary theory, see, Figueira, The Hermeneutics of 
Suspicion: Cross-Cultural Encounters with India (London: Bloomsbury 2015), introduction.
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it in terms of the master-slave dialectic (Hegel 1994). Marx addressed the ques-
tion of the other in his analysis of fetishism and ideology (Marx 1990; Marx 
and Engels 1970). In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl identified the Other 
as never absolutely alien, but as always and everywhere recognized as other 
than me (Husserl 1960: 112–17). In each of these formulations, the Other is 
viewed by analogy. This notion of the Other as alter ego was taken to an even 
more radical extension by existentialist philosophers such as Sartre (Sartre 
1943: 413–29) and Heidegger, who described the other in the context of their 
theories regarding inauthentic existence and bad faith (Heidegger 1962). In all 
these formulations, the Other is reduced to the ego’s horizon of consciousness 
and is, as such, always mediated. Mirroring the ego, the Other is assigned no 
intrinsic value beyond its role as a duplication of the same. Not surprisingly, 
in the wake of the Holocaust, certain thinkers, most notably Levinas, felt that a 
reassessment of Heidegger’s thought was warranted, as was a revaluation of 
the transcendent subject.
In postcolonial theory, the Other continues to be seen in mediated form. 
Now, however, it is understood to function as a gross distortion of the Self 
and assumes a political significance. Narcissistic and aggressive projec-
tions onto this Other are understood as compensations for a perceived lack 
in the European “individual.” Edward Said’s Orientalism claimed to reveal the 
extent to which the Other was monolithically constructed to support imperial 
hegemony (Said 1978). Borrowing from structuralism, Said posited that indi-
vidual action, cultural forms, and social institutions can be reduced to stable 
essential elements. He then was able to view East-West encounters in terms 
of a Foucauldian drama where a “western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over” (Said 1978: 3) other cultures enables the actual 
deployment of European colonialism. Grounded in a hermeneutics of suspi-
cion visibly rooted in the works of Marx, Freud, and Gramsci, Said’s critique 
of orientalism has informed most subsequent scholarship. It spawned postco-
lonial theories, influenced multicultural debates, and invigorated Asian Studies 
(Figueira 2008:32). As I have shown in a number of publications, it has become 
the master narrative of current-day cross-cultural encounters where interpre-
tations of the non-Amero-European Other are judged as forms of subterfuge 
created to consolidate Amero-European power and domination (Figueira 1991, 
1994). Individual theorists then added their own blend of spices to this heady 
brew.
This politically charged Other, largely bereft of any ethical-theological 
modes of being, can now appear as obsessively reiterative. We should also 
acknowledge here Bakhtin’s critique of a hierarchical, centripetal ordering of 
the world where all authority is vested in a singular hegemonic ideology that 
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suppresses dissent. One can also enlist Frantz Fanon’s perception of the sub-
jugated as a phobic object (Fanon 1963) or Jacques Lacan’s theory of the way 
in which individual subjects are constituted to support a postmodern theory 
of alterity (Lacan 1966). Henry Louis Gates would borrow from Lacan to map 
subject formation onto a Self-Other model (Gates 1991: 463). Homi Bhabha 
would then bring together Freud’s concept of the fetish and Fanon’s schema of 
the imaginary to define the colonial subject as the reformed and recognizable 
Other, a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite (Bhabha 
1992), while Abdul Jan Mohammed would warn us against the undifferenti-
ated Manichaean view of the Other (Jan Mohammed 1985). Such postmodern 
approaches all tend to focus on psychologizing modern fantasies of alienation. 
Their starting point can be situated in a pathologization of the classical era as 
the origin of a climate culminating in nineteenth-century imperialism. 
Like their classical and early modern precursors, these poststructuralist 
conceptions of the Other also focus on the Self. By seeking to assess the psy-
chodynamics of appropriation, they often grapple with the impossibility of por-
traying the Other as anything but a translation of the European familiarity with 
the Self. A key difference between earlier conceptions of the Other and the 
poststructuralist formulations is that the latter acknowledges that the process of 
trying to understand involves issues of appropriation or, at least, creates condi-
tions for colonization. The result of this operation confirms Foucault’s assertion 
that power and knowledge are entwined and recognized as such (Foucault 
1970). It is, however, in this very notion of recognition and, significantly, its 
relation to interpretation that hermeneutic approaches to the Other distinguish 
themselves from poststructuralist constructions of alterity.
As Hans-Georg Gadamer so succinctly put it in Dichtung und Wahrheit: 
To seek one’s own in the alien, to become at home in it, is the basic 
movement of the spirit, whose being is only a return to itself for what is other. 
(Gadamer 1960: 11). 
As Paul Ricoeur would explain, this movement (represented by the con-
cept of Bildung) provides a structure of excursion and reunion (Ricoeur 1969: 
16–17). If the circular structure of hermeneutic understanding is complete, 
the spirit moves to the strange and unfamiliar, finds a home there, and makes 
it its own or recognizes what was previously perceived as alien to be its 
genuine home. Hermeneutic understanding, then, consists of a movement of 
self-estrangement in which one must learn to engage and know the Other in 
order to better know oneself. Selfhood is by nature dialogical and thus suf-
fused with otherness. In fact, in a reversal peculiar to Bildung, the movement 
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of the spirit resembles a “true” homecoming, its point of departure being 
essentially a way-station and the initial alien-ness a mirage produced by 
self-alienation.
Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy—which stretched back through 
Heidegger to Dilthey and Schleiermacher—pursued the idea of a reconcilia-
tion between our own understanding and that of strangers in terms of a fusion 
of horizons (Gadamer 1960: 273–74, 337–38, 358). 
What I want to stress here is how we engage with alterity. At one pole 
of the hermeneutical field, there is the hermeneutics of belief (hermeneutical 
consciousness) directed at recovering a lost message and animated by a will-
ingness to listen. At the other pole, we find a hermeneutics of suspicion (critical 
consciousness) aimed at demystifying and animated by distrust and skepticism. 
In broad terms, these two hermeneutical positions define how we approach the 
Other today. And I think that what we need to understand is that most recent 
forms of criticism (Foucualdian, post-Foucauldian, Saidian, post-Saidian, colo-
nial discourse analysis, postcolonialism, multiculturalism and the critique of 
globalization) all opted for a hermeneutics-of-suspicion approach, one that is 
indebted to Jürgen Habermas’s view that all communication is distorted by ide-
ology (Habermas 1980). The Foucauldian quest to unmask power structures 
was deemed politically righteous and thus more relevant to those individuals 
sitting in Ivory Towers and aching to man (at least metaphorically) some bar-
ricade somewhere. The critique of ideology was simply too attractive and too 
rich, overflowing with the many abuses, self-obsessions, and projections of the 
Amero-European sense of superiority and intellectual imperialism which schol-
ars could claim to battle. Scholars could now allege to engage in a viable form 
of social action. So, scholarship dealing in any encounter with the Other or with 
cross-cultural encounters simply adopted, with varying degrees of sincerity 
and efficacy, the critical-consciousness stance even though it was often quite 
self-referential and self-serving. Paul Ricoeur countered this trend in his inter-
vention in what would become known as the Gadamer-Habermas debate and 
in his subsequent work. Ricoeur proposed a middle path between the two her-
meneutical positions by charting the ontological and ethical categories of oth-
erness and advocating for dialogue between the Self and the Other. Ricoeur’s 
middle path, while deemed unfashionable for the last forty years, has of late 
gained renewed interest, especially since his death in 2005. Two contemporary 
thinkers, Michel de Certeau and Emmanuel Levinas, shared Ricoeur’s concern 
with the ethical dimensions of engagement. 
The heterological procedure was interpreted by Certeau as presenting 
no simple opposition between Self and Other, but rather a procedure akin to 
a form of psychoanalysis. Of necessity, interpreters must recognize that their 
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representations of the Other are contaminated by their own intrusive identi-
ties. Implicit instances of social alterity precede the interpreter and their effects 
continue to inform the interpreter’s work, inducing forms of unconscious repe-
tition through which the past returns to haunt the present (Certeau 1986: 4). For 
Certeau, the Other is thus structurally re-formed as a projection or residue of a 
legitimate interpretive operation. It becomes a site of uncertainty upon which 
the dead resistance of the past inhabits and haunts the present. Difference can 
be seen then not as something created solely by a given power structure, but 
as formed by what hegemony fabricates in us in order to plaster over its former 
conquests (Certeau 1986: 6). In this respect, the historian or reader becomes 
an apologist for the present regime as well as an operator of the forgotten past. 
The Other can then be assimilated into the “same” by eliminating resistance 
through an idealization of the past. Certeau suggests that such idealizations 
cannot be avoided. His conceptualization of heterology, in fact, requires that 
we address their existence and acknowledge the ensuing ethical demands any 
utopian vision imposes on our encounters with the Other.
Ricoeur claimed that one of the best ways to de- alienate the Other is to 
recognize and treat oneself as another and the Other as (in part) another Self. 
Ethics also enjoins me to recognize the Other as someone capable of recog-
nizing me in turn. The Other is thus configured as a Self capable of both rec-
ognition and esteem. For Ricoeur, the concept of narrative memory is what 
allows us to preserve the trace of the Other (especially the victims of history) 
who would, if unremembered, be lost to the injustice of non-existence. Through 
narrative mimesis, the Other within calls us to act on behalf of the Other without. 
However, in order to be faithful to this Other, one has to have a Self and, once 
again, it is narrative that creates a sense of identity and allows us to sustain a 
notion of selfhood over time. This developed sense of identity also produces 
the self- esteem that is indispensable to ethics and serves as a guarantee of 
one’s fidelity to the Other. 
Let me here call to mind the overriding argument I am constructing with 
regard to the relevance of religious studies for the humanities. At the beginning 
of my talk, I tried to show some of the reasons why religion and the humanities 
have not been fertile sites of production in the past. If, however, we set aside 
certain outdated and preconceived notions that hinder inquiry, religious stud-
ies and the humanities have a great potential to nourish each other. First and 
foremost, we can start by reintroducing into the humanities the ethical dimen-
sion that has been submerged with the rise of secularism in American culture 
and in the university setting. And I feel that the hermeneutics of consciousness 
approach can help us recuperate this ethical dimension, particularly through 
its formulations regarding our encounters with alterity. 
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According to Ricoeur, the indispensable critique of the Other is necessary 
in order to supplement the critique of the Self. The hermeneutics of suspicion 
must, therefore, operate in both directions and on both fronts simultaneously. 
Real relations between humans demand a double critique , with both the Self 
and the Other entering into a dialectic relationship of mutual responsibility. In 
this respect, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics differs considerably from those theories 
of alterity based on a Foucauldian conception of power dynamics. By alerting 
us to the irreducible alterity of all incomers, Ricoeur challenges the vision of 
fluidity and hybridity informing much of recent critical formulations of alterity. 
His approach also stands in contrast to the radically minimized role of the Self 
in relation to the Other, as found in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. For Ricoeur, 
the stranger is relatively Other. For Levinas, it is so radically Other that I cannot 
even represent it to myself or enter into a relationship with it. To do so would 
assimilate the Other and, thereby, reduce it to the same. 8
Levinas envisions a loss of selfhood and terror through immersion in the 
lawless chaos of what he terms il y a (“there is”).9 In On Escape (2003), Levinas 
instructs us how to evade this chaos. The source of light can only be found in 
something other than Being: I see another as someone I need in order to realize 
certain individual and personal wants. By looking at the face of the Other, I should 
be able to transform it into a moment of my own material or spiritual property. 
Instead, the appearance of the Other, in fact, breaks, pierces, and destroys the 
horizon of egocentric monism. The Other invades my world; its face or speech 
thus interrupts and disturbs the order of my ego’s universe. Something present 
in the Other manifests itself and I am chosen to discover myself as someone who 
is totally responsible for this determinate Other and who must bow before the 
absoluteness revealed by its look or speech. In other words, the Other makes 
me accountable for my life. The self is thus linked ab initio to the Other from 
which it is radically separated, yet unable to escape. Levinas posits the relation 
of the Self and the Other as the ultimate horizon (Levinas 1969: 3/33ff).
8  It is not happenstance that both Ricoeur and Levinas offered ethical approaches to our engage-
ment with the Other. Both were the chief proponents of phenomenology in France in the postwar 
period and very early on in their publishing careers, they addressed the ramifications of Edmund 
Husserl’s philosophy.
9  Husserl’s renewal of philosophy through phenomenology can be summed up by the term “inten-
tionality.” All consciousness is a cogito of something (cogitatum). The ego must be directed out-
side the Self. The intentional structure of consciousness can, therefore, be characterized as the 
interplay between subject and object. In the ’30s, Heidegger transformed this vision of phenom-
enology by viewing consciousness as rooted in deeper levels of “being there” (Dasein). Heidegger 
conceived of Being in light of the expression es gibt, a formulation that Levinas would subsequently 
transform into his notion of il y a. However, Levinas understood the concept of il y a as radically 
different from Heidegger’s es gibt.
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Levinas connects the Other with an ethics of generosity: to recognize 
the Other is to give. Generosity to the Other is, however, a one-way move-
ment (Levinas 1969: 349). The Other is not a member of my community, but 
a stranger who cannot be reduced to any role or function in my world. To do 
justice to Others, we must come face to face with them, become subordinated 
to their vocative address, and speak to them. Most importantly, however, we 
cannot reduce the Other to a textual element in a narrative on the Other. As an 
interlocutor, Levinas’s Other is not an object of discourse (Levinas 1969:69). In 
radical opposition to Ricoeur’s concept of engaging alterity through mimesis or 
Certeau’s psychoanalytically structured procedure, Levinas’s Other can neither 
be grasped nor objectified; it cannot be reduced to any textuality or reinscribed 
in narrative form. According to Levinas, the only possible response to this Other 
is respect, generosity, and donation – which brings me to my conclusion:
III.  How and Why Should We Read the Other?
Tere are several points we can take from the discussions concerning 
alterity outlined above. Hermeneutical consciousness seeks to engage the 
Other. It has been overshadowed by the critical consciousness approach that 
has almost exclusively informed the last forty years of scholarship. The criti-
cal consciousness approach views such encounters as acts of intellectual and 
cultural mastery. As a critique of ideology, it severely limits the possibility of 
cross-cultural understanding. Ricoeur proposed a middle path between her-
meneutics and the critique of ideology. He maintained that creative discourse 
permits us to recognize that we are confronted both by ideological distortions 
and utopian ideations. The former strives to dissimulate legitimate power and 
the latter questions authority and seeks to replace the reigning power structure. 
Ricoeur, therefore, acknowledged the need for a hermeneutics of suspicion. 
This acknowledgment allows us to transform the absolute Other into a relative 
Other so that we might be able to see it as another Self. However, Ricoeur also 
saw, as did Certeau, that the mastery of the Self in relation to the Other is dis-
rupted before discourse can even imagine itself in control. Following Gadamer, 
Ricoeur recommended an understanding of hermeneutics that posits the possi-
bility of recovering a text’s lost message while maintaining the necessary suspi-
cions aimed at demystifying it. Underlying this understanding is the belief that 
our temporality and historicity make sense only when organized in narrative. 
Both Ricoeur and Certeau acknowledged that through narrative not only those 
in power but also those bereft of power exercise a political will. Levinas pre-
sented us with a radically different perspective on our ability to engage the 
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Other. In the first place, he speaks of the irreducibility of the Other to any text 
about him or her. Ricoeur and Certeau set certain limits to our engagement, but 
they never denied the very possibility of such an encounter. Levinas, however, 
claims that we cannot grasp or assimilate the Other who, in turn, breaks and 
destroys our spiritual horizon of egocentric monism. Whereas Ricoeur empha-
sizes the dynamics of reciprocity with the Other (“I need the Other and, in giv-
ing, I receive”), Levinas has us held hostage by the Other. 
The important lesson taught by the fruitful complications Ricoeur, Certeau, 
and Levinas brought to notions of alterity – complications that expanded the 
abstract politicization of the Other found in the post-structuralist criticism I have 
outlined here today – is that the Other is not a purely political concept but rather 
relational, and that as such any serious engagement with the Other will neces-
sarily entail an ethical dimension. This is where, I think, Religious Studies can 
be very useful, by bringing back into discussion the ethical component that the 
dominant hermeneutics of suspicion theories have tended to ignore. (And I am 
sorry if, to make my point, I had to spout so much theory!) I began my talk today 
by looking at how the role of religion within the study of the humanities has been 
marginalized. We saw how it was affected by institutional biases, theological 
preconceptions, disciplinary doxa, and pedagogical fads. We also saw how 
we are historically and sociologically preconditioned in American universities 
not to seek religious meaning outside Religious Studies departments (that is, 
if they are even allowed to exist on campuses in any real form). As I then tried 
to show with my summary of heterological criticism, the political and institu-
tional imperative to engage with the Other has been ill-served by much of this 
theoretical discourse due to said discourse’s inability to provide a legitimizing 
pace for the validity of relational experience. Finally, I examined how ethical 
structures of meaning make convincing claims for relevance in the works of 
Ricoeur, Certeau, and Levinas provide grounds for improved inquiries in the 
humanities. 
By shifting direction from the exclusive embrace of a hermeneutics of sus-
picion, we open up the ethical possibilities inherent in the path of hermeneuti-
cal consciousness. Personally, in my teaching, I venture down the middle path 
between the hermeneutical consciousness and the hermeneutics of suspicion 
championed by Ricoeur. I have found that viewing encounter in terms of some 
fusion of horizons as well as a product of ideological discourse solidifying the 
imposition of power is more fruitful than our endless attempts at unmasking var-
ious forms of epistemic hegemonic violence. In any case, a renewed interest 
in the ethics of our engagements with the Other is sorely needed. It can serve 
as the lynch pin for greater understanding of the world’s differing approaches 
to Transcendence, something I think we can all agree is necessary in these 
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troubled times. Moreover, I would even say that our engagement with the Other 
is the primary task facing us today both inside and outside the university.
Religious Studies and the humanities can and should inform each other. 
With its emphasis on comparison within an ethical framework, Religious Studies 
is perhaps the best venue for assuming the task of expanding the potential for 
relational meaning through the study of the Other. Ironically, the very Otherness 
of the study of religion itself within American academe – and our recogniz-
ing this Otherness and its history – can facilitate future responsible encounters 
with Otherness. The willingness and ability to dialogue across disciplines and 
across worldviews is pivotal to the university’s mission of promoting diversity 
and tolerance. The multiplicities of religions in the US and the study of this mul-
tiplicity in Religious Studies (as in this very department at Riverside) open up 
a propitious space to explore diversity and convergences. By theorizing a truly 
ecumenical path for future engagement, we can thus invigorate the university’s, 
the community’s, and our own commitment to the Other.
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